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Abstract
Background: Building on its National Tobacco Control Policy initiated in 2000, Vietnam is currently considering
introducing a comprehensive law to strengthen the implementation of tobacco control policy. This study analyses
the positions of key stakeholders in the development of tobacco control legislation in the context of a largely
state-owned industry, and discusses their implications for the policy process.
Methods: Several qualitative methods were employed for the study including: literature review and documentary
analysis; key informant interview; focus groups discussion; and key stakeholders survey.
Findings: The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Finance are key players in the
tobacco control policy and legislation, representing competing bureaucratic interests over health, macro-economy
and revenue. High-ranking officials, including the Communist Party and National Assembly members, take a rather
relaxed position reflecting the low political stakes placed on tobacco issues. The state-owned tobacco industry is
regarded as an important contributor to the government revenue and gross domestic product, and the relative
weight on health and socioeconomic issues placed by stakeholders determine their positions on tobacco control.
Overall, short-term economic interests have more immediate influence in setting policy directions, with the
consequences of health gains perceived as relegated to a distant future. This was reflected in the position of
tobacco control advocates, including MOH, that presented with reluctance in insisting on some tobacco control
strategies revealing a mixture attitude of concessions to the socioeconomic uncertainties and a sense of
bargaining to win the strategies that are more likely to be accepted.
Conclusion: The state-ownership of tobacco industry poses a major paradox within the government that benefits
from manufacturing of tobacco products and is also responsible for controlling tobacco consumption. The
perceptions of negative implications on government revenue and the macro-economy, coupled with the
reluctance to challenge these issues from health perspective too directly, means that tobacco control has yet to
secure itself a place on the priority policy agenda. The overall policy environment will shift in favour of tobacco
control only if the economic framing can be challenged.
Background
Vietnam is an emerging middle-income country in
Southeast Asia with a population of over 86 million [1],
having shifted from a centrally planned economy towards
a more market-oriented economy since the inception of
Doi Moi (renovation) policy in 1986. The reforms have
brought remarkable economic growth with an increase of
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from USD 400
in 2000 to USD 1,160 in 2010 [2]. Despite this economic
liberalisation, Vietnam has maintained a socialist political
system, with the state assuming central role in economic
development. Major enterprises, including tobacco,
remain largely state-owned [3].
Parallel to its economic growth, population disease
patterns are changing in Vietnam, with a decline in
communicable diseases, increasingly replaced by non-
communicable diseases over recent years [4]. Life-style
related health risks are becoming increasingly recognised
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consumption: Vietnam has one of the highest smoking
rates in the world. Findings from national surveys sug-
g e s tr a t e so fs m o k i n ga m o n gm a l ea d u l t si ne x c e s so f
50% [5-7], though smoking is not a common practice
among females of whom less than 5% smoke. In August
2000, the government of Vietnam issued a resolution on
the National Tobacco Control Policy 2000-2010 [8]. The
resolution was a manifestation of the government’s com-
mitment to combat the epidemic of tobacco related dis-
eases in Vietnam, anticipating its political participation
in the upcoming Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC). The former Steering Committee on
Tobacco Control under the Ministry of Health (MOH)
was upgraded in 2001 to become the Vietnam Steering
Committee on Smoking and Health (VINACOSH) that
currently involves five ministries and five mass organisa-
tions (largely affiliated with the Communist Party, such as
the Vietnam Fatherland Front) as its members. On 21
May, 2003, Vietnam was represented in the World Health
Assembly when it adopted the FCTC, and in 2004, was
one of the first nations in the region to ratify the FCTC.
The action plan to implement FCTC was launched in
August 2009 [9], and the new Tobacco Harm Prevention
Law is being drafted at the time of this research [10].
Since the inception of the National Tobacco Control
Policy, over fifteen decrees and decisions have been issued
for implementation, including an increase of excise tax
and smoking ban in designated public places. Educational
messages appear on the media regularly, and warning
labels on cigarette packages have been enlarged and
brought to the front panel with clearer messages on the
associated risk of smoking-related diseases. The proposed
Tobacco Harm Prevention Law includes a set of regula-
tions on tobacco manufacturing, trade and distribution,
smoke-free environment and protection from exposure to
second-hand smoke, restriction on tobacco image use in
art products, smoking cessation activities, and a tobacco
control fund. Yet, despite the apparent vigour with which
the government of Vietnam has responded to the interna-
tional agenda on tobacco control, progress with legislation
and implementation has been cautious.
This study aims to analyse the positions of key stake-
holders in the development of Tobacco Harm Prevention
Law in the context of a largely state-owned industry in
Vietnam, and discusses their implications for the policy
process, and the tensions that cause the paradox between
the government commitment to tobacco control and
delays in finalising and passing the Tobacco Harm Preven-
tion Law.
Methods
This study employs a case study approach [11] adapting
Varvasovszky and Brugha’s stakeholder analysis guidelines
to identify and analyse the positions of key stakeholders,
their primary interests and power relationships, and their
engagement with the proposed Tobacco Harm Prevention
Law [12]. In terms of an explanatory model for examining
differing stakeholder perspectives on policy, we use Grin-
dle and Thomas’ bipolar characterisation of policy as
either “crisis”–those issues perceived as requiring urgent,
decisive action to ensure political stability–or “politics-as-
usual”–those more routine policy issues that do not gener-
ate the same sense of priority, and may be engaged over a
longer time frame [13].
Despite the recent economic changes implicit in Doi
Moi, Vietnam maintains a one-party dominated socialist
political system, and as in all “elite” interviewing [14],
access to some policy stakeholders can be difficult [15].
To increase our rigour in seeking insight into the posi-
tions of relevant stakeholders, and to address their com-
plex political agendas, we have employed a multi-
strategic approach in this research, triangulating findings
from both direct and indirect sources and complemen-
tary research methods [16].
The research was undertaken through literature review
and documentary analysis, key informant interviews and a
focus group discussion, and a survey of selected members
of the National Assembly. The literature review explored
tobacco control policy, policy analysis, the evidence on
available tobacco control interventions, and the political
system with reference to Vietnam, other communist states
and developing countries.
Electronic literature searches of PubMed, Medline,
Google and Google Scholar were performed with key
words including “tobacco control”, “policy analysis”,
“Vietnam”, “communist state”, “developing country”,
“political system”.
Additionally, government reports, donor reports and
legislative documents on the political context, and
tobacco smoking in Vietnam, were obtained with assis-
tance of the Health Strategy and Policy Institute (MOH)
for analysis. The analysis focused on potential stake-
holders involved in tobacco control policy, the magni-
tude of tobacco related disease burden, and the progress
of the formulation and implementation of tobacco con-
trol policies in Vietnam.
In consultation with VINACOSH, key informants were
identified using an “event-based” sampling approach
[17,18] based on the legislation process for the Tobacco
Harm Prevention Law. Three major ministries were identi-
fied as key actors in tobacco control policy: Ministry of
Trade and Industry (MTI); MOH; and Ministry of Finance
(MOF) (see Figure 1).
In addition, seven critical actors were identified
across different sectors and hierarchical levels for
interview, based on their roles in the policy process
(Table 1). Despite introductions through VINACOSH,
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Tobacco Harm Prevention Law, informants from the
state-owned Vietnam National Tobacco Corporation
(VINATABA) declined to be interviewed. The inter-
views were semi-structured, aimed at exploring the role
of each stakeholder and their position in the develop-
ment of Tobacco Harm Prevention Law, respondents’
perceptions of proposed policy instruments, and the
tensions between stakeholders with competing agendas.
Interviews were completed between February and
March 2010 (HH, TAH, ADN) in English or in Vietna-
mese assisted by an interpreter. The interviews were
pretested with staff from the Health Strategy and Policy
Institute.
In addition, one 60-minutes focus group discussion
was held with six staff members of the MOH aimed to
further elaborate on the perceptions on the strategies,
potential obstacles, and opportunities to progress with
the Tobacco Harm Prevention Law.
All interviews and discussions were transcribed into
Vietnamese or English, depending on the language used
for each session, and were summarised in English. The-
matic analyses were conducted on textual data, assisted by
the ATLAS.ti 6.1 programme [19]. Emergent themes were
discussed by all researchers for a final consensus. Ethics
clearance was obtained from the School of Population
Health Research Ethics Committee at the University of
Queensland.
Communist Party 
(Dept. of Propaganda & 
Training) 
- Consultation/  direction 
- Propose  issues 
Research institutions 
- Provide  evidence 
- Policy  consultation 
Government office 
(Dept. of Regulation) 
-  Indicate/approve issues that 
need regulations 
-  Direct related ministries to 
prepare regulations 
National Assembly 
(Dept. of Social Issues) 
- Discuss  regulations 
- Approve  regulations 
Transfer for 
discussion
Feedback for 
revision
Ministry of Health 
(Dept. of Examination & Treatment, 
VINACOSH) 
-  Propose issues that need regulations 
- Prepare  regulations 
Submission
Ministry of Justice 
- Check  regulations 
for consistency 
Ministry of Trade & Industry 
(Production and trade) 
Ministry of Finance 
(Tax and price) 
Feedback for revision
Checking 
Figure 1 Legislation process of Tobacco Harm Prevention Law.
Table 1 Stakeholders included in the key informant interviews
Stakeholder Represented interests
National Assembly Office (NAO) Legislative branch
Government Office (GO) Executive branch
Department of Propaganda and Training, Communist Party (DPT) Party
Bureau of Treatment and Examination, MOH (MOH-TE) Ministry (public health)
Bureau of Legislation, MOH (MOH-L) Ministry (health-related law)
Vietnam Steering Committee on Smoking and Health (VINACOSH) Ministry (tobacco control)
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) Ministry (industry, economics)
Ministry of Finance (MOF) Ministry (revenue, budget)
Vietnam Public Health Association (VPHA) Academic public health, civil society
World Health Organization (WHO) Multilateral agency
HealthBridge Canada (HBC) International NGO
NB: The abbreviations in Italics represent the informants in the interviews and focus group discussion, and denote quotes from the interviewees in the text.
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by the National Assembly to provide information sessions
on the Tobacco Harm Prevention Law to members of the
National Assembly and their staff in Hanoi and in one
Northern Province. A self-administered questionnaire was
distributed as part of the evaluation process linked to
these information sessions, providing an exceptional
opportunity to access the perceptions on tobacco control
of difficult-to-access higher-ranking officials. Response
rates were 67 (65%) and 35 (50%) for the first and second
sessions, respectively (Table 2). The central session con-
ducted in Hanoi was dominated by central level policy
officers and administrative staff, with a proportionately
higher representation of provincial level officers and health
professionals at the provincial session. The questionnaire
comprised structured and semi-structured questions
related to tobacco control policy and the proposed legisla-
tion including: overall understanding of tobacco as a pub-
lic health issue; perceptions on the available evidence
surrounding tobacco control activities; and positions to
the proposed tobacco control legislation (see Additional
file 1: Questionnaire form).
Results
Key policy decision makers in Vietnam
The Communist Party of Vietnam
The political system in Vietnam is highly centralised and
represents a “mono-organizational socialism” in which
the Communist Party exercises sole power as stated in
t h eV i e t n a m e s eC o n s t i t u t i o n .T h eP a r t yt a k e so v e r a l l
leadership on all aspects of politics and state administra-
tion [15]. As one of the informants succinctly described:
“the Party directs, the government manages, and the
ministries follow” (DPT; quote from interview).
The ongoing legitimacy of Party control has been
maintained by multiple factors. Using Thayer’s [20]
adaptation of Weber’s classification [21], the Party gains
charismatic legitimacy from the legacy of Ho Chi Minh;
performance legitimacy through its high economic
growth since Doi Moi; rational-legal legitimacy through
the 1992 Constitution [22]; and international legitimacy
through its membership in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), World Trade Organization
(WTO) and others.
However, although there has been a growing separation
o fP a r t ya n ds t a t es i n c et h ei n t r o d u c t i o no ft h eDoi Moi
policy, the Party maintains its direct influence on state
activities such as the careers of senior officials [23], licen-
sure for religious activity [24], active control of political
dissent [20] and the retention of certain policy positions
such as the one-to-two child family [25]. More impor-
tantly, the Party maintains a shadow structure that runs
parallel to all political institutions through which it exerts
its authority by manipulating the processes in the formal
structure [26]. The Party General Secretary is one of
highest figures amongst the leadership in Vietnam, with
the majority of senior positions in the government filled
by Party members. Party influence is extensive through-
out the policy decision-making process prior to its intro-
duction to the National Assembly, though elements of
the Party such as its Department of Propaganda and
Training, would only become involved once the policy
had been determined (DPT; interview).
With overarching responsibilities for both economic
and social control, however, the Party presented an
ambivalent position on tobacco control policy, with the
respondent’s major concern identified as how to offset
the imperatives of macroeconomic development against
the health issues associated with tobacco:
“... we must keep the balance between production of
tobacco, distribution of tobacco products, and pro-
motion of public health.” (DPT; quote from interview)
The National Assembly
T h eN a t i o n a lA s s e m b l yi st h el e g i s l a t i v eb o d yo fV i e t -
nam. Constitutionally, the Assembly “is the highest
representative organ of the people and the highest organ
of State power of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” [22].
The Assembly has the power to prepare, adopt and
amend the Constitution as well as making laws, and to
implement state plans and budgets. However, its primary
function is to concretise the Party’s decisions into laws
and decrees, with the final approval or annulment rights
Table 2 Composition of survey respondents at the
National Assembly
Category 1
st survey 2
nd survey
Administrative level
Central 34 (50.8) 8 (22.9)
Provincial 21 (31.3) 22 (62.8)
District 1 (1.5) 2 (5.7)
Commune 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Missing 11 (16.4) 3 (8.6)
Total 67 (100) 35 (100)
Occupation
Medical doctor 9 (13.4) 11 (31.4)
Teacher 1 (1.5) 0 (0.0)
Reporter 1 (1.5) 0 (0.0)
Manager 4 (6.0) 7 (20.0)
Bonze 1 (1.5) 0 (0.0)
Officer 15 (22.4) 4 (11.4)
Other 16 (23.9) 5 (14.3)
Missing 20 (29.8) 8 (22.9)
Total 67 (100) 35 (100)
Numbers in parentheses represent percentages.
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at the government, the majority of seats at the Assembly
are filled by members from the Party, although a few are
conceded to approved “independents”. A general national
election is held every five years at which people vote
from candidates pre-screened by the Party.
Although the legislation process is a closed process in
principle, it is gradually opening up to accommodate the
ideas and opinions of the civil society and general public:
“... the National Assembly has a mechanism to open
the floor to non-governmental organisations and
public to comment on that [draft law]. ... I think
Vietnam is gradually opening up to the public. For
example, we are invited to the National Assembly
sessions. I think it is something very advanced in
Vietnam. They openly talk to us; they encourage us
to attend to give our comments.” (HBC;q u o t ef r o m
interview)
However, tobacco control has yet to secure itself a
place on the priority agenda for most Assembly mem-
bers. From the results of the National Assembly survey,
fewer than half the respondents recognised the scale of
tobacco-related mortality as larger than the combined
mortality caused by HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.
Surprisingly, the respondents in the first session, which
was dominated by central and Provincial administrators
and bureaucrats, had better ideas on the issues surround-
ing tobacco and were more supportive of control, while
those in the second, Provincial session–where close to
one third of the National Assembly representatives and
staff were medical officers–seemed to be less informed
(see Table 2). There are two potential implications: firstly
that the tobacco control agenda has not been communi-
cated strongly through the medical profession (35% of
health professionals smoke [28]), and secondly, decisions
on tobacco control made at the central level may lack the
appropriate perception of political priority for implemen-
tation at local levels.
Again, economic considerations were prominent in the
National Assembly responses:
“To convince the National Assembly and the govern-
ment of the proposed Tobacco Harm Prevention
Law, MOH must show evidence on tobacco harms,
and the perceived impact on the society and econ-
omy.” (NAO; quote from interview)
The government and affiliated bodies
The primary role of the government is to translate the
Party’s directives into strategies and plans for implemen-
tation [15] through its 16 ministries and 5 ministry-level
organisations. The duties of the government includes
drafting laws, decrees, state plans and budgets, as well as
their subsequent implementation upon approval; assuring
national security; organising foreign relationships; and
economic development [27]. Ministries are at the fore-
front of government bureaucracy, preparing strategies
and development plans, drafting policies, laws and regu-
lations, and adopting regulatory documents for policy
implementations [29]. The structure of ministries is simi-
lar, with the office of the Minister, professional and func-
tional divisions, training centres, state enterprises and
research institutes relevant to the field. The decision for
recruitment of civil servants in the central ministries is
directly made by the Ministers, based on the recommen-
dations from the Director of Personnel, and senior posi-
tions are, almost without exception, filled by Party
members [29].
Although five ministries and five mass organisations
are involved in VINACOSH, three major ministries pre-
vail as key actors in tobacco control policy: MTI, MOH,
and MOF, and their stated positions reflect the com-
plexity of the issues.
The Ministry of Health maintains the strongest position
on tobacco control policy and law. Its mandate to ensure
public health is the driving force in the effort to reduce
tobacco consumption among the Vietnamese population.
Headed by the Minister of Health, though multi-sectoral
in nature, VINACOSH coordinates tobacco control activ-
ities, and has been responsible for developing the Tobacco
Harm Prevention Law.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry, which controls
VINATABA and as a consequence has a clear vested
interest in resisting tobacco control initiatives, claims to
be cooperative in the effort to reduce smoking-related
harms. Although MTI does not necessarily see tobacco as
a priority industry for further investments and production
growth, as clearly proscribed by the National Tobacco
Control Policy [30], it is still an important contributor to
the GDP and tax revenue. In its response, MTI argues that
the legislation proposed by the MOH is too narrow in
perspective:
[The Tobacco Harm Prevention Law] “is one-sided
from the perspective of health sector only, primarily
focusing on the reduction of supply. The MOH pro-
posed law should be part of a comprehensive tobacco
control law that is harmonised with different stages
of tobacco industry such as production, manufactur-
ing, and trade.” (MTI; quote from interview)
The Ministry of Finance stands between these two
ministries, responsible for collecting tax from industry
and allocating budget to different sectors, including
health. However, interviews with MOF officials suggest
that the economic and financial perspectives of MOF
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Clearly, as Miles’ Law points out: “Where you stand
depends on where you sit” [31]. The position of MOF
reflects the relative importance of the industry, and its
dominance over the other social sectors.
“Tobacco industry contributes 15% of the govern-
ment revenue. ...a high excise tax will increase smug-
gling that is still out of control. ...We should have a
reasonable strategy for excise tax. Otherwise, it will
affect the socioeconomic development and result in
increased smuggling.” (MOF; quote from interview)
“MTI is very important, MOF is controlling the bud-
get, and certainly both have powerful voices in the
government, while MOH is less powerful [since it] is
related to health issues only.” (WHO;q u o t ef r o m
interview)
The Government Office is responsible for receiving and
approving (or annulling) draft laws proposed by all min-
istries and submit to the National Assembly for initial
review. Once it receives feedback from the Assembly, the
Government Office coordinates with relevant ministries
to finalise the draft law for and formally introduce to the
Assembly session for ratification. Even after the draft law
has been fed into the formal process, the Government
Office is still in a position to coordinate with the relevant
committees at the National Assembly.
Representatives of the Government Office presented a
neutral position to the content of the Tobacco Harm
Prevention Law, reflecting its role as a coordinating
body of all sectors. Nonetheless, its power to prioritise
which draft laws it introduces to the National Assembly,
means its position in relation to the Tobacco Harm Pre-
vention Law has important implications.
Tobacco control advocates
The Tobacco Control Working Group assumes a central
position in coordinating tobacco control advocates in Viet-
nam. Convened in 2003 by the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) and HealthBridge Canada, it has grown
rapidly which now involves over 70 members from various
organisations at different levels including government
agencies, international agencies, civil society organisations
and academia [32].
International agencies from bilateral and multilateral
donors can be powerful in influencing the decision-mak-
ing process of a host government [13]. However, few
international stakeholders are involved in the tobacco
control dialogue in Vietnam. There are only two UN and
five international non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) involved in the Tobacco Control Working
Group [32]. Some respondents from the interviews
attributed the slow process of tobacco control policy to
the lack of international pressure. This is in contrast to
the HIV/AIDS policy which was endowed with major
international support for its technical aspects, resource
mobilisation, and in influencing the opinions of high-
level decision makers [15], and in the word of one
respondent, putting “strong pressure to the government”
(VINACOSH; quote from interview).
The primary roles of WHO, HealthBridge Canada,
Atlantic Philanthropies and others, which are involved
in the Tobacco Control Working Group, are to provide
technical and financial support to facilitate tobacco con-
trol without exerting substantive political influence on
the government. With the Japanese government and the
World Bank, the largest bilateral and multilateral donors
in Vietnam, not engaged in this arena, the policy lever-
age of international actors is relatively low in tobacco
control.
Several civil society organisations are engaged in
tobacco control activities, with ten local NGOs currently
involved in the Tobacco Control Working Group [32].
Different NGOs have various focuses in tobacco control
which may include pilot projects (e.g. smoke-free com-
munity, quit-line), health education, advocacy and
research. However, these NGOs have mostly emerged
since the adoption of Doi Moi in the 1980s, with the evo-
lution of civil society still in its early phase. The post Doi
Moi influx of foreign aid, including international NGOs,
has catalysed a new paradigm within civil society. Many
international NGOs rushed into Vietnam with models
that provide aid through counterpart NGOs [33]. These
were meant to pursue a bottom up approach to partner
with “local” NGOs, with an emphasis on participatory
development. This transition has triggered an explosion
in the number of civil society activities throughout the
1990s, and by 2005, 140,000 community-based organisa-
tions, 3,000 cooperatives, 1,000 locally registered NGOs
and 200 charities were present in Vietnam [33]. However,
m a n yl o c a lN G O sv i e wt h e m s e l v e sa sap a r t n e rt o ,o ra n
extension of, the state-run mass organisations to support
existing government policies, and most, if not funded by
the government, are heavily regulated by it [33]. There-
fore civil society operates, in a sense, within the con-
straints of the one-party framework.
The Vietnam Standard and Consumer Association
(VINASTS), for instance, is actively involved in the
Tobacco Control Working Group representing civil
society. Its commitment in tobacco control features policy
advocacy and public education [32]. However, its founding
members comprised former Party executives and officials,
and senior positions have been held by retired officials
from various ministries or state-owned enterprises [34].
The Vietnam Public Health Association (VPHA) is a social
and professional association, which now assumes the lead-
ing role in the Tobacco Control Working Group. VPHA’s
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or implementation of existing policies, including tobacco
control, through pilot projects and research. Similar to
other local NGOs, it is financially managed by MOF and
was admitted as a member of the Vietnamese Fatherland
Front, the “political base of people’s power” [22]. But the
unique position of VPHA, as a result of these connections,
is its capacity to link tobacco control advocates with high-
ranking policy makers, giving them channels to “access
and approach the National Assembly members” (VPHA;
quote from interview). While its position differs from typi-
cal NGO relationships with government as understood in
Western contexts, it is invaluable for the Tobacco Control
Working Group.
Academia plays another key role in providing evidence
to policy makers in support of decision making. Research
institutes involved in the Tobacco Control Working
Group include Hanoi School of Public Health, Social
Institute, Institute of Economics, Academy of Finance
and University of Trade [32]. The Prime Minister’s
Research Commission has an advisory role, but the lim-
ited number of technical advisors who are able to provide
direct support to the government constrains the potential
of technical leadership in Vietnam [35]:
“Governments in foreign countries have big consult-
ing networks. The government of USA has over
6,000 consulting firms. Our government has only a
research team. Apart from the government office,
there are only a few research institutes under the
ministries.” (GO; quote from interview)
Tobacco industry
The tobacco industry in Vietnam is largely state-owned.
VINATABA stands at the heart of tobacco industry,
manufacturing 46.2 billion sticks of cigarettes which cov-
ered 58% of the domestic market share in 2007 [36,37].
The production capacity of cigarettes in Vietnam is 90-
100 billion sticks per annum, which are either domesti-
cally consumed or exported to other countries [38].
Tobacco industry ranks third, after oil and alcohol,
among the major contributors to the government rev-
enue in Vietnam (MTI and MOH; interviews). The
tobacco industry is known as one of the most powerful
marketers and lobbyists.
“For the government of Vietnam, there are two main
sources of information for tobacco: MOH; and
tobacco companies.” (NAO; quote from interview)
“I think that, very likely, some barriers come from
the tobacco industry, I’m sure. ...they are excellent
lobbyists. So I think that one of the first difficulties
must be coming from the tobacco industry.” (HBC;
quote from interview)
Transnational tobacco companies are increasing their
shares on foreign brand tobacco products, which are
domestically produced under licensing contract and joint
v e n t u r ea g r e e m e n t s .C u r r e n t l yt h e r ea r et h r e ef o r e i g n
companies distributing tobacco products in Vietnam: Brit-
ish American Tobacco; Phillip Morris International; and
Japan Tobacco Inc. In 2005 about 25% of cigarettes sold in
Vietnam were linked to foreign brands. This has increased
to nearly 30% in 2008 [39]. Lee et al. [40] discussed the
strong political influence exercised by British American
Tobacco to gain access to the Vietnamese market. The
presence of transnational tobacco companies within the
tobacco policy is manifested in the Decision 88/2007/QD-
TTg on the strategy of tobacco industry [41] where the
above three enterprises are quoted as “strategic partners”
in producing cigarettes. The number of foreign tobacco
enterprises may increase with the recent movement of
Common Effective Preferential Tariff negotiated among
member states of the ASEAN, which has largely abolished
tariffs on tobacco leaf imports, and other non-tariff bar-
riers will be removed in the future [42]. The Thai Tobacco
Monopoly has initiated engaging with a joint venture with
a private company to market its product in Vietnam [42].
These advancements of foreign companies in Vietnam
contradict the principle of the National Tobacco Control
Policy that proscribed new investments exceeding the pro-
duction capacity of tobacco above the level of 2000 [8].
Although not explicitly raised at interviews, such
encroachments clearly suggest that transnational tobacco
companies certainly form part of the influential actors in
Vietnam.
Discussion
Grindle and Thomas [13] distinguish between “crisis” and
“politics-as-usual” models of decision making, and postu-
late different hypotheses for each. In “crisis” the level of
the decision-making hierarchy moves upwards, pushed by
high stakes for political stability, while under “politics-as-
usual” the issues are more relaxed, with decision making
focused on bureaucratic power relationships, and with
bureaucratic agencies competing with each other to win
support or challenge opposition. With tobacco a largely
state-owned enterprise, directly linked to both MTI and
MOF, and providing predictable government revenue, the
views outside the health sector are largely dominated by
“politics-as-usual” and a focus on the short term economic
returns from the industry.
“One of the elements which slow down the legislation
process of tobacco control law is the [competing]
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topic.” (MOH-TE; quote from interview)
In contrast, the tobacco issue is seen more as “crisis”
by MOH and other advocates for tobacco control, as
they perceive its increasing morbidity and mortality, and
calculated the projected health and economic effects of
current smoking rates over the next decades.
Comparing the position of tobacco and HIV/AIDS poli-
cies, both of which risk significant mortality unless con-
trolled, provides some useful insights. Both these two
policy environments rest upon a strong government appa-
ratus, with central state organs dominating the policy dia-
logue, although limited windows are made open to civil
society. However, the levels at which decisions have been
made differ for the two policies. The drastic reform and
rapid change of the HIV/AIDS policy were pursued by the
Communist Party with determination, driven by the high
political stakes arising from the perceived threat of HIV/
AIDS to the nation’s development–"crisis” in policy terms
[15]. This is in clear contrast to the tobacco control policy,
where the main drivers are at the bureaucratic level, with
internal ambivalence in the positions of different stake-
holders within the crucial Party organs and relevant
ministries.
Table 3 interprets the positions of each actor to the
Tobacco Harm Prevention Law as was assessed by the
researchers during interviews and focus group discussion.
While respondents in both interviews and focus groups
were careful not to express overt opposition to the pro-
posed Tobacco Harm Prevention Law, their perceptions
on tobacco control could be grouped in several cate-
gories. Some may appreciate the importance and fully
support tobacco control interventions, while others may
show supportive attitude yet are sceptical with the total
benefit of tobacco control to the society.
The relative weights on health and socioeconomic issues
placed by each stakeholder determine the individual posi-
tion on tobacco control. Ministries are divided into sec-
tors, which makes their positions relatively clearer, while
those at the higher hierarchy are trying to balance these
competing agendas manifested in their ambiguous posi-
tions. However, as the position of MOF indicates, eco-
nomic issues seem to have more immediate influence in
setting policy directions, with the consequences of health
gains less visible, and perceived as relegated to a distant
future. But this in turn suggests that the provision of evi-
dence on socioeconomic implications may influence the
positions of some stakeholders on tobacco control. In
Table 3, the overall stakeholders’ position to tobacco con-
trol policy would shift substantially in favour of tobacco
control only if the economic framing of the issues were
challenged. In this sense, the current balance between the
two competing issues: tobacco as a public health priority
issue; and tobacco as a socioeconomic issue, needs to be
challenged. Policy makers need to see in economic terms
the impact of tobacco as a health priority–with evidence
that underscores both the magnitude of the latent macroe-
conomic threat and the scale of that impact, both cur-
rently and for a generation to come [43]. (This should not
be confused with the commonly made claims of future
saving of healthcare costs due to reduced smoking, which
was argued by Barendregt et al. [44].)
In the conduct of this research, researchers have dis-
cussed with tobacco control advocates their strategies,
noting that they are acutely aware of what might, or
might not, be acceptable to the most stakeholders, and
modify their positions accordingly. Interestingly, health
advocates are acutely aware about the opposition they
face, at times rehearsing apologist positions for the indus-
try, arguing that “health staff need to understand the full
picture”. Despite the demonstrable cost-effectiveness of
increasing taxation [45], for example, caution was com-
mon:
“I think, to increase tax, it should be 2-3 years later
because we have just increased tax in early 2008.”
(VINACOSH; quote from interview)
The FCTC action plan recommends that a roadmap
should be developed for excise tax increases, but does not
provide any target level of percentage to which the tax
rate should be increased [9]. Further, concrete require-
ments for the excise tax increase are not included in the
draft Tobacco Harm Prevention Law, with advocates attri-
buting its exclusion to the fact that excise tax is managed
by MTI, though precedents exist in other decrees and
decisions managed under different ministries. Although
there may be concessions among the advocates regarding
the uncertainties surrounding the broader socioeconomic
implications, there is a sense of bargaining to win those
priority issues which are more likely to be accepted over
the less likely ones.
Finally, this study has some limitations that are worth
noting. We used the approach proposed by Varvasovszky
and Brugha [12] as the guide for our analysis. However,
the approach itself is not without limitations. First, a
major drawback rests with its cross-sectional nature
while analysing a policy environment that is often subject
to rapid changes. Such changes may originate from inter-
nal events, external events, and even from the stake-
holder analysis itself [12]. Therefore, the validity of
findings from the analysis may diminish fairly quickly if a
major event takes place (e.g. changes in leadership).
Further, the validity and reliability of responses can be
difficult to establish. The individuals interviewed may not
accurately reflect the views of their host organisations
depending on the degree of stability of positions the
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minimised by triangulating findings from different
sources, certain levels of uncertainty remain.
Another limitation is the absence of interviews with
representatives from the tobacco industry, including
VINATABA and transnational tobacco companies with
which it has established licensure or joint venture agree-
ment. Access to tobacco industry spokespersons for policy
research is generally recognised as difficult, as researchers
in other countries confirm [46,47]. However, because of
government ownership of tobacco industry in Vietnam,
industry positions advocated in negotiations with VINA-
COSH were able to be confirmed, to a certain extent, in
discussions with their responsible government agency, the
MTI.
Conclusion
The fundamental paradox surrounding the tobacco con-
trol policy in Vietnam arises from the contradictory posi-
tion of a government that benefits from manufacturing of
tobacco products, and is also responsible for controlling
tobacco consumption. The short-term economic interests
of the ministries responsible for the largely state-owned
tobacco industry remain in tension with the MOH, and
health advocates who recognise the long term implica-
tions of what is one of the major risk factors in the bur-
den of disease. The industry’s importance is reflected in
the ambivalent position presented by high-ranking deci-
sion makers with respect to Tobacco Harm Prevention
Law. Such dilemmas are further exacerbated by the one
party governance, where bureaucrats do not have the
tradition to express overt oppositions. This is revealed in
the somewhat hesitant position of the MOH to strongly
insist for a further tax increase. The perceptions of nega-
tive impacts on government revenue and the macro-
economy, coupled with the reluctance of MOH to chal-
lenge these issues from health perspective too directly,
means that tobacco control policy has yet to be recog-
nised as “crisis” in policy term. The overall policy envir-
onment will shift in favour of tobacco control only if the
economic framing can be challenged.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Questionnaire form. Survey questionnaire form
distributed to members of the National Assembly.
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